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LIABILITY OF THE OWNER OF AN AUTOMOBILE FOR
THE NEGLIGENCE OF HIS CHAUFFEUR AND
OF HIS FAMILY IN THE OPERATION
OF HIS CAR.
The law governing and applicable to the ownership and operation of the relatively new machine denominated "automobile," due to that machine's general, common and constant use
on public highways, has become so voluminous as well, as important, its development so enormously rapid and exceptionally
varied that it may be classified as a distinct branch of our legal
system which in turn may be subdivided and classified under
a greater diversity of heads possibly than were even employed
in the whole subject of negligence before the introduction of
this hitherto unknown method of transportation. The governing principles, the basis of the law, however, is not new but
merely a new application of old and tried rules of the common
law to new and varied conditions arising out of the general use
of this mode of travel upon our thoroughfares. Of course, it
would be utterly impossible to deal in the most general way with
the whole subject of the law of automobiles in a single article.
So, I have concluded to confine the scope of this discourse to
certain phases of the "law which fix the rights and measure
the responsibilities of the owner of an automobile, when driven
or operated (1) by his hired chauffeur; and (2) by his infant
son or daughter, the latter subdivision being sometimes denominated "the family purpose doct ine." Nor caA we, in the
short space allowed, do more than classify the cases upon these
extensive branches of the subject, briefly examine their basic
reasoning and hurriedly discuss their relative merits.
The (iability of the owner of %ear is readily apparent
when an injury occurs to a thir4 person from the negligent
operation of the car by the hired chauffeur engaged in the
master's business, or acting within the scope of his employment. In such cases the chauffeur is merely the servant or agent
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of the owner and the common law rule of respondeat superior
applies with full force. Anciently it was said, and it is yet
the law, that whenever the master intrusts a horse or carriage
or anything which may be readily made an implement of mischief, to his servant to be used by him in furtherance of his
master's business, or for the execution of his orders, the master will be responsible for the negligent management of the
thing intrusted to the servant so long as the latter is using it
or dealing with it in the ordinary course of his employment.
And it has likewise been and is now the law that if the act
is done without the authority of the master and not for the
purpose of executing his orders or doing his work, then -he is
not responsible. The rule requiring the master to respond in
damages so well expressed by the old maximum "qui facit per
alium facit per se," is just as sound and useful today as when
first formulated, and its application, to the owner of an automobile operated by his chauffeur is recognized everywhere. In
fact, the owner of a4 automobile stands in the relation of master, and every legal wrong committed by the chauffeur in the
course of his employment, though no express command or order
of the master be given, or proven, the owner is nevertheless
liable. Such liability springs out of the relation itself, and does
not depend on the stipulations of the parties Within the scope
of his authority the servant may be said to be the nedium
through which the master acts. It follows, as a general rule,
that for the tortuous acts of the chauffeur or servant the master or owner is liable. This principle, an old one, was applied
in Robinson v. Webb,1 but, of course, it was not applied in that
case to an automobile as that instrumentality was not then in
common- use. The reason assigned for the rule, as stated by
Chief Justice Shaw, is "every man in the management of his
own affairs, whether by himself or by his agents or servants,
shall so conduct them as not to injure another; and if he does
not, and another thereby sustains damage, he must answer
for it. But the master is not liable for the acts of his servant
or driver committed out of the course of his employment; nor
for his willful trespass unless committed by the command of
the owner or master, with his assent." The hired chauffeur is,
111 Bush 465.
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therefore, a mere agent or servant of the owner in, the operation of the car and the owner must respond in damages for any
legal wrong which the chauffeur may commit2 by operating the
car in the regular course of his employment.
Where, however, the wrong is committed while the chauffeur is operating the car for his own pleasure or upon his own
business, as distinguished from that of the owner or master,
the latter is not liable. In 1925 our court announced the rule
as follows:
"The universal test of -the master's liability for the acts of his
servant is, was there authority, express or implied, for doing the act;
that is, was it done in the course and within the scope of the master's
employment? If so, the master will be liable for the act, whether negligent, fraudulent, deceitful, or an act of positive malfeasance. However,
the master is not liable for every wrong which the servant may commit
during the continuance of the employment. The liability can only arise
when the act done is within the real or apparent scope of the master's
business. Hencb, when a servant steps outside of his employment to
do an act for himself not connected with his master's business no liability attaches. The reason for the rule is that beyond the scope of his
employment a servant is as much a stranger to his master as a third
person. In every such case the proper inquiry is was the servant engaged in serving his master? If the act be done while the servant is at
liberty from the service and pursuing his own ends exclusively, the
master is not responsible."

Frequently cases have arisen where the hired chauffeur
who had the right to take out the ear, caused an injury while
pursuing some business of his own independent of his regular
employment; and the courts have uniformly held, so far as we
are able to discover, that the owner was not liable for the tort.
Sometimes, however, it is difficult to determine from the proven
facts whether the chauffeur was engaged in the service of his
master or was pursuing some object of his own, in the operation
of the car at the time the injury was inflicted, and upon the
turn of the facts depends the whole question of liability of the
owner of the car. Even more difficult questions are presented
when the chauffeur while on an errand for his employer, departs for a few minutes from the direct course and engages
in a detour for purposes of his own, especially is this true
when the detour employed by the chauffeur leads back to his
place of employment and thus brings himself by an indirect
course to the place his master expected him to reach by a more
2
See 2 R. C. L. 1190-98; 18 R. C. I. 791, 792; 26 L. R. A., N. S. 382;
18 R. C. L. 248-249. Berry on Automobiles, page 1039.
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direct one. Of course, these questions do not arise when the
owner of the automobile is himself occupying the car or directing its movements. There is and must always be a strong presumption that the owner riding in his own car has complete
control over it. The contributory negligence of the chauffeur
may likewise be imputed to the master when the latter is riding
in the machine so as to preclude recovery by the master of
injury to himself or the machine.
Coming now to the case of an owner whose driver varies
from the direct course and while doing so causes an injury, the
result of negligence, it must be said that there is no complete
unanimity of opinion among courts upon the subject but the
liability of the owner is made to depend, in some degree, on
the amount of variance from the proper course. A slight
diversion from the course indicated by the owner does not necessarily relieve the master from responsibility for the negligence of his driver. But where the driver departs so far from
the line of his duty that for the time being his acts constitute
an abandonment of his services, the master is not liable. 3 The
test of the master's liability laid down by our court in such
cases is found in Tyler v. Stephan's Admr.,4 where is was
said:
"In the case under consideration, the chauffeur had no duties to
perform for the owner until the hour of twelve o'clock p. m., approached. There was a period of about two hours and a half during
which time he was at liberty from the service. While thus at liberty
he set out on a journey exclusively his own and having no connection
with his master's business. The case is not one where the journey, if
continued until its termination, would have resulted in carrying out

the object for which the chauffeur had been employed. It is not a ease
of mere deviation from the established route or of temporary departure
from duty. It is a case where the servant was at liberty and was
serving his own purposes wholly independent of his master's business.
It will not do to say, therefore, that although the chauffeur had undertaken the journey exclusively for his own purposes, the mere fact that
he had turned the automobile around and was coming back into the
city with the ultimate intention of returning to the Wood residence
for the defendant and her family, shows a resumption of the master's
business."

Again, where the diversion of the driver is not great in
comparison to the course and distance directed to be taken,
the owner cannot escape liability; but if the departure is such

"Eakins

v. Anderson, 169 Ky. 1.
4163 Ky. 780.
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as to show an abandonment of the owner's service by the driver,
the owner is relieved. 5
Many illustrative cases from states throughout the union
intended to enable students and courts to determine when the
diversion made by the driver was such as to relieve the owner
of the car from responsibility for the negligence of the former,
are cited in the texts where thio subject is discussed, and they are
varied.
Another phase of the subject much akin to the one we have
just been considering, is that which arises when the negligent
injury occurs after the chauffeur, who has deviated from the
line of his employment, has returned to his course before the
happening of the accident In such eases the owner is generally held liable; but sometimes the question of fact is submitted to the jury. 6 Upon this subject the court in the case
of Barmore v. Vicksburg Raslway Company,7 observed:
"The rule that, where a servant has made a temporary departure
from the scope of his employment, the responsibility of the master for
the tort of the servant attaches immediately after the purpose of such
departure has been accomplished and as soon as the servant re-engages
In the discharge of his duty, applies where an employe of a railroad
company, whose duty requires him to use a railroad tricycle to aid in
gathering wood, leaves the place where he is thus employed, to carry
a sick friend on the tricycle to a station, and, after leaving such friend
at the station, injures a third person through his negligence in running
the tricycle though the accident happens before the servant reaches
the place from which he started."

The contrary view, however, seems to have the support
of a majority of the courts, and it is thus stated in Anderson
v. Nagle:8
"The defendant's son, where he had turned about and started upon
his homeward journey had not -then completed the trip upon which he
had embarked for his own purposes. He had not then returned, he was
but returning to his employment. He was upon his own trip until he
had returned to the point of departure from the path of duty, or to a
point where, in the performance of his duty, he was required to be.
This view is supported by practically all the authorities, and is not out
of aocord with the decisions of the courts of this state."

As to when a driver has sufficiently returned to his masTyler v. Stephan's Admr., supra; Wood v. Indianapolis Abattoir
Company of Kentucky, 178 Ky. 188; Crady v. Greer, 183 Ky. 675;
Eakins, Admr. v. Anderson, supra.
6Brooks v. Swift, 98 Southern 16.
* 85 Miss. 426; 70 L. R. A, 627.
* (Mo. App.), 259 S. W. 858.
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ter's business to fi liability upon the latter, the court in Cummings v. Republic Truck Company,9 said:
"In order to constitute a re-entry upon the business of the master
under such circumstances, it was not essential for the servant to have
reached the zone of his employment
or the territory in which he was
employed to make deliveries." 0

It must be conceded, however, that no formula can be
stated that will enable courts in all cases to solve the problem
whether at a particular moment a particular servant is engaged in his master's business. This will always depend upon
the precise facts of each case. What the servant was doing
and why, when and where, and how he was doing it, will effect
the case. Seemingly it has been held that where the owner
allows his chauffeur, after carrying him to his destination, to
employ the ear to pay a visit to his relatives with instruction
to return for the owner at a given hour, in pursuance to that
direction the chauffeur, after leaving the home of his relatives
to go for his employer, negligently causes an injury, the master is liable on the theory that the chauffeur had again entered
the service of his employer."1
Another closely related phase of the liability of the owner
of an automobile for the negligence of the driver, is that which
arises when the same is driven by a member of his family, but,
of course, it has never been held that the relation of parent
and child of itself is sufficient to render the parent liable for
the negligent operation of his automobile by the child, even
though an infant. But, if the child occupies the position of a
servant or agent of the parent and owner, the rule applicable to master and servant immediately becomes effective.
In a few states, especially Michigan, by statute the owner of
an automobile is made liable for all injuries inflicted by the
negligent operation of his machine when operated by 'his consent, and it is to be conclusively presumed that the car is
operated by the consent of the owner when it is shown that a
member of his family had it in charge. This, of course, changes
the common law rule to the extent of the terms of the statute.
9241 Mass. 292; 155 N. E. 134.
11Glass v. Wise, 155 La. 477, 99 So. 409 (1924), and Wyatt v. HodY.
son, 210 Ky. 47.
1Tyler v.Stephen's Ad4mr., supra; Wyatt v. Hodson, supra.
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It is generally declared by courts supporting the family purpose doctrine that the liability of parent for the tort of a
minor rests upon the same basic principles as the liability of
a master for the acts of his servant, but there is a distinction,
it would seem, with respect to those acts which are done at a
time when the child is driving on a mission of his own. Hfowever, our court as well as that of several other states, has
adopted the rule that one who provides an automoble for the
pleasure and convenience of himself and family, is liable for
injuries caused by the negligent operation of the machine while
it is being used for the pleasure or convenience of a member
2
of his family.'
Even though the automobile was owned by the father for
the use of his family, -he is not liable for injury occasioned
by the car when driven by his infant son without the knowledge
or consent of the father.
A strong clear statement of the reason for the rule and
the rule itself is found in Biro& v. Ambercrombi, 13 the court

saying:
"It seems too plain for cavil -thata father who furnished a vehicle
for the customary conveyance of the members of his family makes their
conveyance by that vehicle his affair, that is, his business, and anyone
driving the vehicle for that purpose with his consent, express or implied, whether a member of his family or another, is his agent The
fact that only one member of the family was in the vehicle at the time
is in no sound sense a differentiating circumstance, abrogating the
agency. It was within the general purpose of the ownership that any
member of the family should use it, and the agency is present in the
use of it by one as well as by all. In this there is no similtude to a
lending of a machine to another for such other's use and purpose, unconnected with the general purpose for which the machine was owned
and kept."

The Minnesota court concluded that this rule was based
upon the theory that the principal or master is responsible for
1 Doss v. Monticello .lectric Company, 193 Ky. 499; Miller v. Week,
186 Ky. 552; Holland v. Goode, 188 Ky. 525. Courts of other states that
have adopted the "Family Purpose Doctrine" are Arizona, in Benton v.
Regeser (1919), 179 Pac. 966; California, in Crittenden v. Murphy, 36
Cal. App. 803; Georgia, in Griffin v. Russell (1919), 144 Ga. 275; L.
R. A. 1916F 216; Minnesota, in Kayser v. Van Nest, 51 L. R. A. 970;
Missouri, in Dailey v. Maxwell, 133 S. W. 351; Montana, in Lewis v.
Steele, 157 Pac. 575; Tennessee, in King v. Smsjt he, L. R. A. 1918F, 293;
South Carolina, in Davis v. Littefield, 97 S. W. 171; Texas, in Allen v.
Bland, 168 S. W. 35, and Washington, in Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash.
486. See also 5 A. L. R. 216; 10 A. L. R. 1860, 1459; 12 A. L. R. 816;
22 A. L. R. 1403; 36 A. L. R. 1150, 1156; 9 A. L. R. 1248; 2 R. C. L. 1199.
50 L. R. A. (N. S.)
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the wrongful acts of his agent or servant, committed while
acting under his express or implied authority and in furtherance
of his business. And in Iowa it was held that if a man owns
a car which he keeps, among other things, for use as a pleasure
vehicle -by his family, and permits his son to drive it, if the
son takes the mother out for a drive in the car, the son would
be the agent of the father, and the car under which such circumstances would be used in the father's service, the furnishing of comfort and enjoyment within his means to his wife
and family being part of a father's business, or service. That
rule insofar as it relates to the negligence of the child while
on a drive for purposes exclusively his own, it would seem, is
-largely based upon expediency rather than sound reasoning,
as shown by the opinion in the case of Hutcins v. H-affner.14
where it was said:
"The adoption of any rule contrary to that followed in this
opinion would, in many instances, deprive the injured party of any
remedy, owing to the usual financial irresponsibility of the owner's wife
or child who may have been driving the automobile at the time of the
accident. The view -taken herein tends to insure justice to parties injured by the negligence of the drivers of automobiles without imposing
undue hardships upon the owner, is favored by the weight of authority,
and is supported by principle and reason."

Much to the same effect is the opinion in the case of Lincb
v. Dobson,15 where the court said:
"Where the car is kept for the use and pleasure of the family, and
one member of the family is using it for his individual pleasure, or for
one of the family purpose for which it is kept, it comes strictly within
the reason of the rule that, in such use, the member of the family is
acting as the agent, in furthering the purposes of the owner, as truly
as though other members of the family were in the car with him, and
that the owner can be held responsible for damages resulting from the
negligent operation of the car while so used."

Perhaps the most elaborate if not the best statement of
this theory is found in King v. Smythe (Ten),: where the
court indulged in the following reasoning:
"It is true that an automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality,
so as to make the owner liable, as in the case of a wild animal loose
on the streets; but as a matter of practical justice to those who are injured, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that an automobile possesses
excessive weight, that is, capable of running at a rapid rate of speed,
65 Colo. 365, 169 Pac. 966.
"108 Neb. 632, 188 N. W. 227.
i204 S. W. 297.
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and, when moving Tapidly upon the streets of a populace city, it is
dangerous to life and limb must be operated with care. If an instrumentality of this kind is placed in the hands of his family by a
father, for the family's pleasure, comfort, and entertainment, the
dictates of natural justice should require that the owner should be responsible for its negligent operation, because only by doing so, as a
general rule, can substantial justice be attained. A judgment for damages against an infant daughter or an infant son, or a son without
support and without property, who is living as a member of the family,
would be an empty form. The father, as owner of the automobile and
as head of the family, can prescribe the conditions upon which it may
be run upon the roads and streets, or he can forbid its use altogether.
He must know the nature of -the instrument, and the probability that
its negligent operation will produce injury and damage to others. We
think the practical administration of justice between the parties is
more the duty of the court than the preservation of some esoteric
theory concerning the law of principal and agent. If owners of automobiles are made to understand that they will be held liable for injury
to person and property occasioned by their negligent operation by infants or others who are financially irresponsible, they will doubtless
exercise a greater degree of care in selecting those who are permitted
to go upon the public streets with such dangerous instrumentalities."

The family purpose doctrine was first adopted in this
state in 1912, when our court delivered an opinion in the case
of Stowe v. Morris,17 basing it, as it seems, entirely upon the
old case of Lashbrook v. ffatton,'8 where an injury was caused
through the negligence of the minor son while driving his
father's carriage, with his approbation, and the more recent
case of Dailey v. Maxwell119 This latter opinion was delivered
in January, 1911. In the Stowe-Morris case our court, Judge
Winn writing, said:
"In consonance with the Kentucky authority named, 20 enlarging
the discussion and applying the same principles to the modern automobile, instead of the carriage, the case of Dailey v. Maxwell, upon
facts largely similar to those proven in the case at bar, establishes the
liabilities of the father. It is interesting to observe the facts in that
case and the conclusions reached as a growth from the Kentucky case."

Further along in the opinion it is stated:
"It was the boy's party, and the father had naught to do with it,
except to give his consent to the use of the car for the pleasure of his
son and his son' s friends. The father's liability was made to turn upon
the precise question we have named as the single vital question in this
case."

Then from the Missouri case this quotation is taken.
"The evdience discloses that the machine was devoted to the use
of the family of which Ernest was a member. It was a pleasure vehicle,
T147 Ky. 386.

1 Duvall 317.
152 Mo. App. 415, 133 S. W. 351.
*Lashbrook v. Hatton, s-qra.

1
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and, when used for the pleasure of one of the minor children of the
owner, how can it be said it was not being used on business of the
owner? It Is the practice of parents to provide their children with
healthy and innocent amusements and recreations; and certainly it is
as much the business of parentage to supervise and control the pleasure
of their children as it is to give them nurture and education . ..
The rule that a father is not liable for the torts of his minor child
applies only to cases where the tort is committed without the consent
of the parent and without the scope of any duty he owes his child. We
conclude that, in running the car, with the consent of his father and
within the scope of the family uses, Ernest was the agent and servant
of his father."
Our court after copying and adopting the foregoing from

the opinion of the Missouri court, added:
"So, in the case at bar, the father had provided his family with
this car as a means of recreation and amusement; and the son, in the
use of the car for that purpose, was not performing an independent
service of his own, but was carrying out what, within the spirit of the
matter, was the business of the father."

Since that opinion was delivered adopting the family purpose doctrine in Kentucky, came the cases of Doss v. Monticello
Light Company, supra; Holland v. Goode, supra; Miller v.
Week, supra, and many others, all recognizing the doctrine as
a part of the law of this jurisdiction.
Blakemore in his work on the law of automobiles, says the
more recent tendency of the courts seem against the so-called
family purpose doctrine, and proceeds to cite a number of cases.
Further discussing the subject the same author, on page 743,
says:
"This doctrine has strong reasons of convenience and public policy
to recommend it but has no basis whatever in the law of agency and
according to'thie great weight of authority in this country the owner
is not liable on evidence merely that the owner permitted his minor
son to operate his car for bis own pleasure as It is held this does not
show that the son was the agent of the father acting in the scope of his
employment as agent."

Much to the same effect is the text of Huddy on Automobiles, 21 and Barry on Automobiles. 22
Certainly the doctrine except when applied to cases where
the injury results while the child is in his father's service or
engaged in performing some service for him, is not based upon
the law of master and servant, or principal and agent, except

by assumption or by implication, but rather upon the exigencies
21

Page 854.
1146.

2Page
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of the situation and it is not, it seems to me, altogether logical
or sustainable upon reason. Perhaps this doctrine came about
in response to the then prevailing thought that the automobile,
then very imperfect on the highway, was a dangerous instramentality which the owner was obliged to master and control
with and by a competent and experienced driver, or else suffer
the consequence. Now all the courts are of one accord in holding the automobile not to be a dangerous instrumentality per
se.2 3 If it be true, as I have suggested, that the family purpose doctrine had its origin in some measure in the idea that
the automobile was a dangerous instrumentality that reason
having ceased, the rule should cease. This theory finds support in the fact that some of the courts which in early times
held to the family purpose doctrine have modified the rule
so as to make the parent liable only for such negligent injuries
as result while the child is operating the car either with the
parent as a passenger or following his instructions and directions, but holding the parent is not responsible for injuries
caused by the negligence of the child where the child was
operating the car upon a mission of his own either of business
or pleasure. One of the late cases supporting this view is
Arkin v. Page,24 it being there held that a parent is not liable
for the torts of a capable minor child, occuring when the child
was driving the parent's automobile, not upon the business for
the parent but solely upon business of pleasure of the child. If
the tortious act done by the son is in furtherance of some independent design of his own, the father is not liable. And a
parent is only liable for injuries resulting from the negligent
operation of his automobile by his child when driven under a
general authority from the parent and. with his consent, express or implied, upon the business of the parent, and his business may be pleasure, convenience, comfort or education of
his family, or any member thereof, as well as the trade, occupation, employment, or undertaking from which he derives
financial gain. A great number of eases may be cited in support of the foregoing proposition. In the course of the opinion
it is said: "It seems rather a fantastic notion that a son, in
Tyler v. Step7en's Admr, supra, and Keck's Admr. v. Gas and
Blectric Company, 179 Ky. 317.
15 A. L. R. (111.).
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using the family automobile to take a ride by himself for
pure pleasure, is the agent of his father in furnishing amusement for himself, is really carrying on his father's business,
and that his fatlier, as principal, should be liable for the result of the son's negligent manner of furnishing the entertainment to himself."
The "family purpose doctrine" seems to rest upon the
theory that inasmuch as the parent purchased the automobile
for the purpose of giving his family the pleasure and comfort
of such service as it could render, that his business with respect
to the automobile was alone to furnish pleasure to his family
to operate the car, he constituted them his agents to carry
out his business by furnishing pleasure to the family, -which it
would appear is a little far-fetched.
The first opinion of the courts of Missouri upon the subject fully sustained the family purpose doctrine in its entirety;
but in Hays v. Haga 25 the rule was im part relaxed, the court
saying:
"After a careful consideration of all the authorities cited, we have
reached the same conclusion, and hold -that -themere ownership of an
automobile, purchased by a father for the use and pleasure of himself
and family, does not render him liable in damages to a third person for
injuries sustained thereby, through the negligence of his minor son
while operating the same on a public highway, in furtherance of his
own business or pleasure; and the fact that he had his father's special
or general permission -to so use the car is wholly immaterial."'2

So it would seem from this brief survey of the authorities
on merely two branches of the subject, the owner of an automobile is enveloped in a maze of law, which if he should fully
contemplate is calculaed to strike terror to his heart and make
his bank account play "hide and seek" with every threatening pedestrian whom he may chance to pass on the highway.
Fax D. SAso,
Justice of the Cowrt of Appeals.
Frankfort, Ky.
21273 Mo. 1; also L. R. A. 1918C 715.
21To the same effect are the cases of Lineville v. Nisson, 162 N. C.
95, 77 S. E. 1096; Blair v. Broadwater,121 Va. 301, L. R. A. 1918A, 1011;
Parker v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87; Van Blarcom v.
Dodygson, 220 N. Y. 111, L. R. A. 1917F, 363; Cohen v. Meador, 119 Va.
429, 89 S. E. 876; Loehr v. Abell, 174 Mch. 590, 140 N. W. 926.

